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I. INTRODUCTION
Howell Township is a prototype of the quiet and prosperous New
Jersey suburbs. The town of 51,000 boasts a median household income
of over $96,000, far exceeding the $53,657 national and $72,062 state
medians.1 Its children attend one of three regional public high schools,
all of which have been ranked in the state’s top third (with two in the top
twenty percent).2 It hosts more than a dozen public parks, including the
1,200-acre Manasquan Reservoir, where visitors can fish, boat, ride
horses, and observe wildlife.3 Eighty-eight percent of Howell’s residents
are white.4
In 2015, Howell announced a plan to rezone twenty-seven wooded
acres to permit construction of seventy-two affordable housing units.5
The public response was immediate and severe. Residents posted dozens
of comments to Howell Happenings NJ, a Facebook community page
administered by private residents of the township, ranging from the
frantic (“Time to sell and get the heck out of here!”) to the ugly (“I moved
to Howell 15 years ago to get away from garbage. Now the garbage is
getting dumped on top of me.”).6 The response by many residents at a
1

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Am. FactFinder, http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/cf/1.0
/en/place/Howell township, Monmouth County, New Jersey/POPULATION/
DECENNIAL_CNT (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Am. FactFinder,
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/cf/1.0/en/place/Howelltownship,MonmouthCounty, New
Jersey/INCOME/MEDIAN_HH_INCOME (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016); Carmen DeNavasWalt & Bernadette D. Proctor, Income and Poverty in the United States: 2014 at 5, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(Sept.
2015),
http://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-252.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Am. FactFinder,
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/cf/1.0/en/state/NewJersey/INCOME/
MEDIAN_HH_INCOME (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016).
2
FREEHOLD REG’L HIGH SCH. DIST., Which High School will my Child Attend?,
http://www.frhsd.com/cms/lib8/NJ01912687/Centricity/Domain/4/Attendance%20
Boundaries.pdf (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016); N.J. MONTHLY, Top School Alphabetical List
2014 (Sept. 2, 2014), http://njmonthly.com/articles/towns-schools/top-schools-alphabeticallist/ (listing Freehold Township High School as 66th, Colts Neck High School as 68th, and
Howell High School as 107th out of 339 schools in the list of 2014 top high schools).
3
HOWELL TWP., http://www.twp.howell.nj.us/Facilities (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016);
MANASQUAN RESERVOIR CNTY. PARK, http://www.nynjtc.org/park/manasquan-reservoir (last
accessed Oct. 30, 2016).
4
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Am. FactFinder, http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table
/1.0/en/DEC/10_SF1/QTP3/0600000US3402533300 (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016).
5
Kala Kachmar, Taxes, Religion at Core of Howell Apartment Controversy, ASBURY
PARK PRESS (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/western-monmouthcounty/howell/2015/10/20/howell-affordable-housing-hearing/742440
48/.
6
HOWELL HAPPENINGS NJ, https://www.facebook.com/Howell-Happenings-NJ157703170966044/ (last accessed Jan. 25, 2016); Alana Semuels, The Pervasive Fear of
Affordable Housing in New Jersey, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.
com/business/archive/2015/12/the-pervasive-fear-of-affordable-housing-in-new-
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township council meeting was decidedly more measured but no less
critical, foreboding the usual suburban fears of higher taxes, busier
traffic, and more crowded schools.7
Some speakers at the meeting, unshielded by the relative anonymity
of a Facebook page, cautioned against Howell becoming “Lakewood
North”—referencing the neighboring town with a large Hasidic Jewish
population.8 A woman urged, “We just want a fair chance to find out
who would be moving in.”9 Many were concerned about the religious
affiliation of the landowner, Rabbi Israel Meyer Hacohen, who was
associated with the Rabbinical Seminary of America.10 A user on Howell
Happenings NJ did not mince words: “This means we are going to have
more Jewish families milking the system.”11
When affluent white communities like Howell oppose affordablehousing plans, their resistance often stems from “fear [of] the changes
that they believe an influx of black, Latino, or lower-income white
residents would bring.”12 The fear that affordable housing will attract an
influx of Jewish residents is far less common but nonetheless springs
from the same place: many residents “want[] their town to stay just as it
[is],” and admitting a minority group would threaten that.13 There is also
an argument of fairness: a resident might have spent decades saving to
afford the price tag and property taxes on a house in an upscale suburb,
and he feels cheated when “poor people just get to move there on the
cheap.”14 Howell officials faced a difficult dilemma—”listen to [their]
constituents and try to block the housing, or listen to the law.”15
“The law” in this case referred to a March 2015 ruling by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey (“SCNJ”).16 Months before Howell
released the controversial plan, the SCNJ decided that the state judiciary
would resume enforcing an affordable-housing doctrine that was first
jersey/421581/.
7
Kala Kachmar, Taxes, Religion at Core of Howell Apartment Controversy, ASBURY
PARK PRESS (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/western-monmouthcounty/howell/2015/10/20/howell-affordable-housing-hearing/742440
48/.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Alana Semuels, The Pervasive Fear of Affordable Housing in New Jersey, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/12/thepervasive-fear-of-affordable-housing-in-new-jersey/421581/.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
In re N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 (“Mount Laurel IV”), 110 A.3d 31 (N.J. 2015).

JOSEPH MARSICO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

152

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

8/30/2017 12:17 PM

[Vol. 41:1

articulated in the 1970s but had since lapsed.17 In 1975, the SCNJ decided
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.18 The
landmark decision—commonly known as “Mount Laurel I”—interpreted
the state constitution to require that municipalities use their zoning
powers to provide low and moderate-income housing options.19 Thus
arose the influential Mount Laurel doctrine, today a staple of property
law casebooks.20 The Fair Share Housing Center (“FSHC”), a non-profit
organization founded to enforce the doctrine on behalf of aggrieved
parties, calls Mount Laurel I “one of the most significant civil rights cases
in the United States since Brown v. Board of Education.”21
At first, many local governments resisted Mount Laurel I.22
Moreover, courts struggled to find the proper way to apply the doctrine,
with “deficiencies . . . rang[ing] from uncertainty and inconsistency at the
trial level to inflexible review criteria at the appellate level.” 23 In 1983,
the SCNJ reaffirmed that “[t]he doctrine is right” but admitted “its
administration has been ineffective.”24 It decided the second Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel case25 (“Mount
Laurel II”) implementing several procedures that would “put some steel
into th[e] doctrine.”26
The New Jersey Legislature finally intervened in 1985 with the Fair
Housing Act (“FHA”).27 One function of the FHA was to create the
17
18

Id.
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel (“Mount Laurel I”), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.

1975).
19

Id.
See, e.g., STEVEN SEMERARO, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY LAW IN THE U.S. 336
(ver. 1.1 2014). Less than a decade after Mount Laurel I, the Court itself observed that “[t]he
doctrine has become famous.” S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel (“Mount Laurel
II”), 456 A.2d 390, 410 (N.J. 1983). See also Alan Mallach, The Betrayal of Mount Laurel:
Will New Jersey get away with Gutting its Landmark Fair Housing Legislation?, NAT’L HOUS.
INST.
(Mar./Apr.
2004),
http://www.shelterforce.com/online/issues/134/
mtlaurel.html (“Ever since the [S]upreme Court’s pioneering Mount Laurel decisions in 1975
and 1983, New Jersey has been seen as a leader across the nation for its efforts to create
suburban affordable housing opportunities.”).
21
FAIR SHARE HOUS. CTR., What is the Mount Laurel Doctrine?, http://fairsharehousing.
org/mount-laurel-doctrine/ (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016).
22
Eight years after Mount Laurel I, the Court “believe[d] that there is widespread noncompliance with the constitutional mandate of [its] original opinion.” Mount Laurel II, 456
A.2d at 410. Even Mount Laurel Township itself had refused to comply with its namesake
doctrine: “[T]en years after the trial court’s initial order invalidating its zoning ordinance,
Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary ordinance.” Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 411.
25
Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390.
26
Id. at 390, 410.
27
Fair Hous. Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 2015).
20
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Council on Affordable Housing (“COAH”), an administrative agency
that would draft regulations to assign each municipality a share of the
burden.28 But the statute hardly solved the problem, and the Mount
Laurel cases were only the first skirmishes in a dispute that continues
today. In March 2015, citing the COAH’s failure to satisfy its
constitutional burden, the SCNJ resumed its role as forum of first resort
to evaluate whether a defendant municipality is complying with its Mount
Laurel obligations—perhaps “the most significant action in the last 30
years of the . . . doctrine.”29
This note will argue that the SCNJ has been too tentative in
managing the Mount Laurel problem. The events of the last forty years
demonstrate that the legislature and the executive—political branches
subject to popular whim—cannot muster the will to commit to an
affordable-housing solution compliant with their constitutional
obligation. Since the Mount Laurel I decision in 1975, the judiciary has
demanded action that its collateral branches have failed to produce.
Where the executive and legislature refuse to comply with the
supreme law of the state, the SCNJ must take command: the SCNJ,
pursuant to its duty to uphold the New Jersey Constitution, should
eliminate any remedy that does not flow through the judicial branch.30
The judiciary has demonstrated time and again that it takes seriously its
Mount Laurel mandate, while the other branches have demonstrated only
that they will put partisan political considerations before their state
constitution.
Still, this issue, like most issues with deep political implications, is
solved most palatably by elected officials rather than by appointed
judges. It also raises thorny balance-of-powers problems. Therefore, the
judicial action proposed in this note should not be understood to foreclose
the other branches from designing an effective legislative or
administrative solution. But even then, the SCNJ should evaluate such a
solution skeptically, and the judicial branch should permanently remain
a forum of first resort for Mount Laurel relief.
Part II of this note will discuss relevant background details to
support the subsequent analysis. Part III will specify the particular sort
of action the SCNJ should take and will argue why it is necessary. Part
IV will briefly conclude and will propose additional lines of inquiry.
28

Id. § 52:27D-305.
Gary Forshner, Affordable Housing: The Next Generation, N.J. L.J. (June 23, 2015);
see also Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 35.
30
See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. VII, § I, ¶ 1 (“Every State officer . . . shall take and subscribe
an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of this State.”); Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d
at 417 (“We may not build houses, but we do enforce the Constitution.”).
29

JOSEPH MARSICO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

154

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

8/30/2017 12:17 PM

[Vol. 41:1

II. BACKGROUND
Three major background topics inform the later analysis. First, it is
crucial to understand how and why the Mount Laurel doctrine is a
constitutional doctrine. This note examines Mount Laurel I and the
SCNJ’s reasoning therein.31 Second, to support the ultimate argument
that the SCNJ should modify its enforcement of the doctrine, this note
tracks Mount Laurel enforcement over the past forty years—a narrative
that on its face exposes how legislative and executive approaches have
been inadequate.32 Third, this note addresses the SCNJ’s latest
pronouncements on the issue in its March 2015 decision.33
A. Mount Laurel I and its Constitutional Implications
By 1975, the states’ power to design and enforce zoning ordinances
was long-settled law. Euclid v. Ambler, the seminal United States zoning
case, was decided nearly fifty years earlier.34 Nectow v. Cambridge
followed shortly after and affirmed the practice of zoning in general
(though it struck down the particular ordinance at issue). 35 New Jersey,
in a 1927 amendment to its constitution, proclaimed plainly that
the Legislature may enact general laws under which
municipalities . . . may adopt zoning ordinances limiting and
restricting to specified districts and regulating therein,
buildings and structures, according to their construction, and
the nature and extent of their use, and the nature and extent
of the uses of land, and the exercise of such authority
shall be
deemed to be within the police power of the State.36
Zoning ordinances in the township of Mount Laurel permitted multifamily dwellings for only farmers and their families and then only if they
were set at least 200 feet from the property line.37 Attached townhouses,
apartments, and mobile homes were outright prohibited.38 The realistic
outcome of these rules, even if not their purpose, was permitting housing

31

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
33
See infra Part II.C.
34
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
35
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185 (confirming that “[t]he [zoning] ordinance
is an elaborate one” but “[i]n its general scope it is conceded to be constitutional within [the
Euclid precedent]”).
36
This language was incorporated into New Jersey’s 1947 constitution. N.J. CONST. art.
IV, § VI, ¶ 2.
37
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 290 A.2d 465, 468 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1972) (“In defendant township multi-family dwellings are only permitted on a farm for
a farmer, a member of the farmer’s family, or persons employed by the farmer, provided the
multiple-family dwelling is not closer than 200 feet from the property boundary line.”).
38
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 719.
32
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that only middle or high-income residents could afford.39 For at least
some of the township’s legislators, the unabashed goal was to “clear out
substandard housing in the area and thereby get better citizens.”40 The
township meant to “provide direct and substantial benefits to [its]
taxpayers” by permitting new development for only higher-income
residents.41
i. Procedure and Issue
It was against this backdrop that a group of plaintiffs sued Mount
Laurel to challenge its zoning scheme.42 Though only “the minority
group poor (black and Hispanic)” were directly represented in the suit,
their essential complaint addressed a challenge faced also by “young and
elderly couples, single persons and large, growing families not in the
poverty class, but who still cannot afford the only kinds of housing
realistically permitted in most places.”43
The trial court acknowledged the breadth of the problem and
lamented that “[t]he judiciary cannot be expected to alleviate a condition
that definitely calls for legislative action from either the national or state
governments.”44 The best the courts could do was to “meet each specific
situation as it is presented.”45 The court recited recent examples of zoning
laws that might have an effect similar to that of Mount Laurel’s, one
tending to exclude lower-income residents: “ordinances which require
minimum interior floor space; which limit lot sizes for a single-family
unit to five acres; which absolutely prohibit the construction of any
additional multi-family units; which prohibit the use of mobile homes on
an individual lot, and which absolutely prohibit all mobile-home parks
from a township.”46 Each of these was upheld, generating a record of
“clearly enumerate[d] judicial standards” the courts could apply to future
zoning schemes.47
But Mount Laurel’s scheme overstepped even these standards. The
“patterns and practice” of the scheme indicated that Mount Laurel “ha[d]
exhibited economic discrimination” with concern “solely for the
betterment of middle and upper-income persons.”48 While a government
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id.
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 290 A.2d at 468 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 465.
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 717.
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 290 A.2d at 472.
Id.
Id. at 467–68 (citations omitted).
Id. at 468.
Id. at 473.
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may use its police power to legislate for the “general welfare” of its
people, that phrase should not be construed to protect only “private
welfare.”49 The Mount Laurel zoning ordinance was invalid.50
An inevitable appeal followed, but the SCNJ recognized that “the
implications of the issue presented are . . . broad and far-reaching” and it
certified the parties’ appeals before the Appellate Division could hear
arguments.51 The issue was not limited to only the poor AfricanAmerican and Hispanic plaintiffs and it was not limited to only Mount
Laurel Township—the housing situation was no less than a statewide
“crisis.”52 The SCNJ embraced the trial court’s reasoning and
conclusion. Mount Laurel was developing a variety of housing projects
for segments of its population that would provide a more favorable tax
base, yet “[a]ll this affirmative action . . . is in sharp contrast to the lack
of action, and indeed hostility, with respect to affording any opportunity
for decent housing for the township’s own poor living in substandard
accommodations.”53 Proposals for less affluent housing were met with
“fear . . . that such housing would attract low income families from
outside the township.”54
ii. Constitutional Principles
Most land use regulations involve only practical, even mundane,
questions of local planning and policy. A municipal decision to limit lot
sizes or to segregate industrial parks away from pastoral suburbia does
not normally invoke the fundamental rights and privileges enshrined in
the Constitution.55 But the SCNJ recognized that Mount Laurel I was not
just an unglamorous case about local land use policy, rather it
contemplated “the basic importance of housing and local regulations
restricting its availability to substantial segments of the population.” 56
The case implicated “fundamental principles” of state law.57
Surely, a state’s police power encompasses and permits land use
regulation.58 If that principle was not clear enough after Euclid and its
49

Id.
Id.
51
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 716.
52
Id. at 716–17.
53
Id. at 722.
54
Id.
55
See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 725 (“[A]s a matter of policy, we do not treat the
validity of most land use ordinance provisions as involving matters of constitutional
dimension; that classification is confined to major questions of fundamental import.”).
56
Id. at 725.
57
Id.
58
Id.
50
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aftermath, it was confirmed by express language in the state
constitution.59 A municipality might believe genuinely—and even
correctly—that its exclusionary policies do serve the “general welfare,”
especially if the inquiry is confined to only the municipality’s existing
residents. After all, Mount Laurel’s residents were surely better off
(economically, at least) when their town contained fewer families with
fewer school-age children. Under New Jersey’s tax structure, “the fewer
the school children, the lower the tax rate.”60 That this policy happened
to exclude certain residents was, arguably, a result not of race or classbased animus but of a cold fiscal calculation.61
But town borders are often illusory, mere historical artifacts of local
geography, commerce, or politics, and they do not yield vacuum-tight
compartments where the policies and practices of one town cannot affect
its neighbors.62 When the ordinances in one town inevitably ripple
outward to touch others, “the welfare of the state’s citizens beyond the
borders of the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be
recognized and served.”63 It is “fundamental . . . that the zoning power is
a police power of the state and [that] the local authority is acting only as
a delegate of that power.”64 Further, “It is plain beyond dispute that
proper provision for adequate housing for all categories of people is
certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare
required in all local land use regulation.”65 The SCNJ reasoned that “the
general welfare which developing municipalities like Mount Laurel must
consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot be parochially

59

N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 2.
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 723. The Court explained, “New Jersey’s tax structure . . .
has imposed on local real estate most of the cost of municipal and county government and of
the primary and secondary education of the municipality’s children. The latter expense is
much the largest, so, basically, the fewer the school children, the lower the tax rate.” Id. The
predictable result was that local planners “eagerly sought” industrial and commercial ratables
while “homes and the lots on which they are situate[d] are required to be large enough . . . to
have substantial value in order to produce greater tax revenues to meet school costs.” Id.
“Large families who cannot afford to buy large houses and must live in cheaper rental
accommodations are definitely not wanted, so we find drastic bedroom restrictions for, or
complete prohibition of, multi-family or other feasible housing for those of lesser income.”
Id.
61
Mount Laurel I, at 723. The Court carefully pointed out that Mount Laurel’s zoning
policies were not rooted in animus against any race or class but were a pragmatic response to
the state’s tax structure. Certain types of municipal development were important “in order to
produce greater tax revenues to meet school costs.” Id.
62
See Mount Laurel I, at 726–27 (citing Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of
Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347, 350 (N.J. 1949)).
63
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 726.
64
Id. (emphasis added).
65
Id. at 727 (emphasis added).
60
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confined to the claimed good of the particular municipality.” 66
It has to follow that . . . each such municipality must plan and
provide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable
opportunity for . . . low and moderate cost housing, to meet
the needs, desires and resources of all categories of
people. . . . [I]t may not adopt regulations
or policies which
thwart or preclude that opportunity.67
The SCNJ pronounced that “[i]t is required, affirmatively, [that] a
zoning regulation . . . must promote public health, safety, morals or the
general welfare. . . . Conversely, a zoning enactment which is contrary to
the general welfare is invalid.”68
The SCNJ’s decision to ground its holding in constitutional law is
critical to the Mount Laurel doctrine’s significance and longevity. An
affordable-housing mandate embedded within the state constitution is not
easily swept away by political caprice.69 More relevant to the substance
of this note, a constitutional doctrine binds all government actors alike—
including all three branches of the state government.70
B. Implementing the Mount Laurel Doctrine
i. Mount Laurel II
Despite the SCNJ’s intrepid holding in Mount Laurel I, the decision
was essentially toothless. Many towns openly refused to enforce it, and
even Mount Laurel itself refused to implement the doctrine bearing its
name.71 The SCNJ observed:
After all this time, ten years after the trial court’s initial order
invalidating its zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains
afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary ordinance. Papered
over with studies, rationalized by hired experts, the ordinance
at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel’s determination
to exclude the poor. Mount Laurel is not alone; we believe
that there is widespread non-compliance with the
constitutional mandate of our original opinion in this case.72
With Mount Laurel II, the SCNJ resolved that “[t]o the best of our
66

Id. at 727–28.
Id. at 728.
68
Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
69
See N.J. CONST. art. IX (specifying the procedures to amend the state constitution).
70
STEVEN H. GIFIS, LAW DICTIONARY 102–03 (6th ed. 2010) (“A constitution represents
a mandate to the various branches of government directly from the people acting in their
sovereign capacity. It is distinguished from a law which is a rule of conduct prescribed by
legislative agents of the people and subject to the limitations of the constitution. . . . The
Constitution . . . is not designed to protect majorities, who can protect themselves, but to
preserve and protect the rights of minorities against the arbitrary actions of those in power.”
(citations omitted)).
71
Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 410.
72
Id.
67
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ability, we shall not allow [this delay] to continue.”73 The SCNJ was
“more firmly committed to the original Mount Laurel I doctrine than ever,
and [it was] determined, within appropriate judicial bounds, to make it
work.”74 Not only did Mount Laurel II reaffirm the constitutional
obligation to provide affordable housing, but it provided a suite of tools
to realize that obligation.75 After Mount Laurel I, constitutional
compliance was at the discretion of each town; but after Mount Laurel II,
the courts themselves could be an effective enforcement instrument,
supplying a “special litigation track for exclusionary zoning cases and . . .
a ‘builder’s remedy’ by which builders could file suit for the opportunity
to construct housing at higher densities than a municipality otherwise
would allow.”76 The SCNJ had “learned from experience . . . that unless
a strong judicial hand is used, Mount Laurel will not result in housing,
but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals.”77
ii. Fair Housing Act and the Council on Affordable Housing
The New Jersey Legislature’s first move to respond to the Mount
Laurel doctrine was its 1985 Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).78 The
legislative findings in the FHA expressly incorporated the SCNJ’s
reasoning:
The [SCNJ], through its rulings in [Mount Laurel I] and
[Mount Laurel II], has determined that every municipality in
a growth area has a constitutional obligation to provide
through its land use regulations a realistic opportunity for a
fair share of its region’s present and prospective needs for
housing for low and moderate income families. . . . The
interest of all citizens . . . would be best served by a
comprehensive planning and 79implementation in response to
this constitutional obligation.
To promote this interest, the FHA created the Council on Affordable
Housing (“COAH”), an administrative agency within the executive
branch.80 Among the COAH’s duties, both upon its founding “and from
time to time thereafter,” are to estimate the need for low and moderateincome housing in the state and to adopt guidelines for municipalities to
determine and satisfy their share of the burden.81
The FHA also includes a process to allow a municipality to certify
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id.
Id.
Id. at 390.
Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 36.
Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 410.
Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 2015).
Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-302(a), (c).
Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-305.
Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-307.
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its housing ordinances, rendering them presumptively valid against a
Mount Laurel challenge for a limited time.82 To assure that future
exclusionary zoning grievances would be managed by the COAH rather
than by the courts, the FHA transferred all pending and future Mount
Laurel litigation to the COAH except where a transfer might result in
“manifest injustice.”83
iii. First and Second-Round Rules
Under the terms of the FHA, the COAH was to update its assessment
of each town’s affordable-housing responsibility every six years.84 For
the third round, this period would increase to ten years.85 In 1986 and
1994, the COAH released its first and second-round rules, respectively,
and both sets generally withstood legal challenge.86
iv. Third-Round Rules
The COAH was due to issue third-round rules in 1999, but political
pressures caused a delay.87 It adopted interim rules at the end of the year
to operate until it could draft an adequate final version.88 But the gap was
longer than expected: permanent rules failed to issue for several more
years, a delay that was “dramatic and inexplicable.”89 Once the COAH
finally did propose permanent rules, the period they were supposed to
have covered had nearly ended.90
For nearly the equivalent of one full round of Mount Laurel
administration, no municipality [was] held to updated
standards reflecting its present and prospective fair share of
the housing needs of its region. The public policies
underlying the FHA and the Mount Laurel
cases have, quite
obviously, been frustrated by inaction.91
And even then, the proposed final rules were unsatisfactory. 92 The
Appellate Division granted the COAH yet another extension but warned
82

Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-313, 317.
Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-316. The Court heard a constitutional challenge to the
FHA but upheld it and “order[ed] that all of the cases pending before [it] be transferred to the
Council.” Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards (“Mount Laurel III”), 510 A.2d 621, 634 (N.J. 1986).
84
Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-307(c).
85
Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-307(c) (amended 2002).
86
FAIR SHARE HOUS. CTR., What is the Mount Laurel Doctrine? http://fairshare
housing.org/mount-laurel-doctrine/ (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016).
87
Id.
88
In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1 et seq., 855 A.2d 582, 586 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2004).
89
Id. at 602.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 602–03.
92
Id. at 608.
83
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that “[t]he continued absence, for an unreasonable time, of a timely, valid
and sufficiently comprehensive interim extension procedure . . . will, of
course, free interested parties from” the COAH’s administrative
restrictions and permit them to again petition the courts for Mount Laurel
redress.93
The COAH again attempted third-round rules in December 2004.94
Two years later, the Appellate Division invalidated parts, but, in a display
of superlative patience yet again, remanded the matter to the COAH to
propose further revisions.95 The Appellate Division imposed a six-month
time limit, placing the deadline in July 2007.96 It granted two further
extensions, and the COAH finally offered its newest draft in January
2008.97
The January 2008 rules were beset immediately by legal challenges
and, perhaps predictably, were rendered invalid in October 2010.98 The
Appellate Division again demonstrated its apparently boundless patience
and remanded the matter to the COAH, directing the agency “to
redetermine prospective need based on a methodology similar to the ones
used in the first and second round rules,” both of which had been held
valid.99 The deadline was five months.100 This time, the SCNJ granted
certification, affirmed the Appellate Division, and emphasized the
gravity of the matter:
Rules to govern the third round cannot wait further while time
is lost during legislative deliberations on a new affordable
housing approach. A remedy must be put in place to
eliminate the limbo in which municipalities, New Jersey
citizens, developers, and
affordable housing interest groups
have lived for too long.101
Nonetheless, the SCNJ granted another five-month compliance
period, setting the deadline at February 26, 2014.102
Naturally, on that date, the COAH filed for another extension.103
Requesting a new deadline of May 1, 2014, its chairperson certified that
the agency was diligently laboring on the third-round methodology; it had
93

Id.
36 N.J. Reg. 5895(a) (Dec. 20, 2004).
95
In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95 by N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., 914
A.2d 348, 402 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
96
Id.
97
Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 36.
98
In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 6 A.3d 445, 450 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010).
99
Id. at 460.
100
Id. at 476.
101
In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96, 74 A.3d 893, 917 (N.J. 2013).
102
Id.; Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 36.
103
Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 36.
94
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reviewed the relevant data but was continuing to evaluate it.104 The SCNJ
later learned that the COAH had hired a consultant to draft the rules just
three weeks before it requested the extension.105 On March 14, 2014, the
SCNJ granted the motion but attached a warning, “[I]f COAH did not
adopt Third Round Rules by November 17, 2014, the Court would
entertain applications for relief,” including requests to suspend the FHA’s
provision protecting municipalities against litigation. 106 Suspending the
provision would permit “actions [to] be commenced on a case-by-case
basis before the Law Division or in the form of ‘builder’s remedy’
challenges.”107
C. Latest Developments
i. COAH’s Failure
Though the COAH was supposed to have issued the third-round
rules in 1999, the COAH’s board found itself convened in April 2014—
fifteen years later—to discuss the latest attempt and to vote on whether
to propose the draft that the board had received just twenty-four hours
earlier.108 The draft passed and was published in the New Jersey Register
on June 2, 2014.109 A public comment period lasted until August 1, 2014,
provoking approximately 3,000 comments.110 The SCNJ’s March 14,
2014 order required the COAH to finally adopt third-round rules by
October 22, 2014 and the board met two days prior to vote on adoption.111
However, the vote split 3-3 and the rules were not adopted.112
The Fair Share Housing Center quickly filed a motion seeking a
return to judicial enforcement of the Mount Laurel doctrine.113 At oral
argument in January 2015, before the parties spoke on the merits, the
SCNJ requested an update on the COAH’s progress toward drafting and
adopting acceptable third-round rules, reminding the COAH
representative that “nothing limited [the COAH’s] continuing ability to

104

Id.
Id. Writing retrospectively in 2015, the Court stated, “It has since come to light that
COAH retained its primary consultant for the development of new regulations on February 6,
2014.” Id.
106
Id. at 36–37.
107
Id.
108
Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 35, 37.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
105
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adopt the required regulations” even as motion practice was ongoing.114
The representative admitted that
COAH has not conducted or scheduled any further meetings
since its October 2014 meeting, that it does not have any
plans to meet further in an effort to adopt Third Round Rules,
and that staff have not been directed to perform
any work in
furtherance of adoption of Third Round Rules.115
Nonetheless, the COAH asserted that it “had not been willfully
contumacious,” had “made all possible efforts to comply with the SCNJ’s
order,” and had “neither ignored nor willfully violated” the order.116
ii. SCNJ’s Granted Relief
Though the COAH pleaded for yet another extension, the SCNJ
“reject[ed] the argument that relief should be withheld in order to allow
COAH even ‘more time’ than it has already been given.”117 In a moment
ripe for a ruthless judicial reprimand—the COAH had dallied for a
decade and a half, had repeatedly submitted inadequate rules, and had
flouted numerous court-ordered deadlines—the SCNJ’s tone was
relatively delicate,
[T]he clarity of COAH’s inaction is apparent. . . . COAH has
had fifteen years to adopt Third Round Rules as it is required
to do in accordance with its statutory mission. It has been
under several orders of the Appellate Division and this Court
directing it to adopt Third Round Rules using a known
methodology by specific deadlines.
It has not done so. More
time is not a viable response.118
It was evident that “the administrative forum is not capable of
functioning as intended by the FHA.”119 The SCNJ could conclude only
that “towns must subject themselves to judicial review for constitutional
compliance, as was the case before the FHA was enacted.”120 After all,
the Mount Laurel doctrine is a constitutional doctrine, and “the courts
always present an available forum for redress of alleged constitutional
violations.”121 “The relief authorized is remedial of constitutional
rights.”122
The SCNJ decided that “the courts may resume their role as the
forum of first instance for evaluating municipal compliance with Mount
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 37.
Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 42.
Id.
Id. at 43.
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Laurel obligations.”123 It described comprehensive procedures for lower
courts to observe when hearing Mount Laurel challenges, and it delayed
the order for ninety days “as a matter of basic fairness” to towns that had
made good-faith efforts to comply with Mount Laurel despite the
COAH’s neglect.124 This judicial process was designed “to track the
[administrative] processes provided for in the FHA” so as to “facilitate a
return to a system of coordinated administrative and court actions in the
event that COAH eventually promulgates constitutional Third Round
Rules that will allow for the reinstitution of agency proceedings.” 125 The
courts were not to become a “replacement agency” and, the SCNJ
repeated several times, “[T]he action taken herein does not prevent either
COAH or the Legislature from taking steps to restore a viable
administrative remedy that towns can use in satisfaction of their
constitutional obligation.”126 But finally, it was time for the SCNJ to act
where the legislature and executive had not; the Mount Laurel doctrine
and its constitutional mandate were “premised on the existence of a
functioning agency, not a moribund one.”127
III. ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT
The SCNJ should take firm control of Mount Laurel enforcement
and relieve the legislature and executive of their power to further stall,
obstruct, or dilute the doctrine. This proposed solution is drastic but
necessary to preserve the legitimacy of the constitutional mandate
articulated in Mount Laurel I and affirmed by its progeny cases.
Regardless, “drastic” should not be read as synonymous with
“excessive” or “imprudent.” The SCNJ is justified in taking drastic
action because the other branches—which the judicial branch must check
and balance—have abandoned their duties. As it pertains to Mount
Laurel, the administrative process is “nonfunctioning” and COAH is
“moribund.”128 Simply, it has failed.
There are three chief reasons that the SCNJ may and must become
the unilateral instrument of Mount Laurel enforcement. First, Mount
Laurel compliance is not just an optimistic public-policy goal but a strict
constitutional requirement.129 “[T]he courts always present an available

123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 44–48, 43.
Id. at 48.
Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 48, 50–51.
Id. at 34.
Id.
See infra Part III.A.
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forum for redress of alleged constitutional violations.”130 Second, seizing
control would not be an unprecedented coup, but rather would resemble
past judicial interventions that produced favorable outcomes.131 Third,
the SCNJ has proven itself to be a trustworthy steward of the critical
Mount Laurel mission where the other branches have failed.132
A. Mount Laurel as a Constitutional Doctrine
It is relatively easy to forgive the legislature for overrunning its
budget or the governor for publicly bickering with political opponents,
not because these blunders are necessarily trivial but because they do not
carry constitutional implications. But Mount Laurel is a constitutional
doctrine.133 It binds government actors and compels their action because
it is backed by the weight of the state constitution, which is itself “a
mandate to the . . . government directly from the people.”134 By
articulating the Mount Laurel doctrine to be contained within and
mandated by the state constitution, the SCNJ imbued the doctrine with
full constitutional authority.135
The nature of the American constitutional system “is that individuals
need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right.
The Nation’s courts are open to injured individuals who come to them to
vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our basic charter.” 136 A
person injured by a violation of some constitutional right can petition the
courts for a remedy “even if the broader public disagrees and even if the
legislature refuses to act.”137 Indeed, the very “idea of the Constitution
‘was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.’”138
B. Mount Laurel and Brown
The Mount Laurel saga resembles, at least in form, a more
prominent line of constitutional decisions. In Brown v. Board of
130

Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 42.
See infra Part III.B.
132
See infra Part III.C.
133
See supra Part II.A.2.
134
STEVEN H. GIFIS, LAW DICTIONARY 102 (5th ed. 2003).
135
Id. at 278 (defining “judicial review” as “the review by a court of law of some act, or
failure to act, by a government official or entity. . . . Under this doctrine . . . the highest courts
of every state have assumed the power and responsibility to decide the constitutionality of
acts of the legislative and executive branches of their respective jurisdictions.”).
136
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
137
Id.
138
Id. at 2605–06 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
131
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Education (“Brown I”), the United States Supreme Court held that racial
segregation deprived schoolchildren of their constitutional equalprotection rights.139 After declaring this principle, the Court ordered
further fact-finding and argument so that it could formulate a specific
remedy.140 Within a year, a second Brown v. Board of Education case
(“Brown II”) remanded each of the consolidated Brown I cases to their
respective District Courts and directed the courts “to take such [action]
as [is] necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these
cases.”141
Even then, certain high-profile politicians opposed integration.142
United States Senator Harry Byrd promoted a “Southern Manifesto”
signed by more than one hundred Congressmen.143 Virginia was among
several states to defy the Supreme Court.144 Its “Massive Resistance”
strategy included a variety of anti-integration laws that were facially and
deliberately unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s plain
conclusion that segregation violated equal protection and its plain
instruction that the states must integrate their schools. 145 By 1964, ten
years after Brown I, “only [five] percent of black students in Virginia
were attending integrated schools.”146
Congress eventually cooperated in the Brown mission by enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.147 Title VI of the Act prompted compliance
in a way the Supreme Court’s order alone could not: it threatened to
withdraw federal funding from any program that discriminated on the
ground of race, color, or national origin.148
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (“Brown I”), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 496.
141
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (“Brown II”), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
142
See Massive Resistance, VA. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.
vahistorical.org/collections-and-resources/virginia-history-explorer/civil-rights-movementvirginia/massive.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Passive Resistance, VA. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.
vahistorical.org/collections-and-resources/virginia-history-explorer/civil-rights-movementvirginia/passive.
147
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-02, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d).
148
Id. §§ 601–02 (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . .
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the
termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to
any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity
139
140
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For the experienced jurists sitting on the SCNJ to decide Mount
Laurel I, Brown could not have been far from mind.149 The Brown
decisions were just two decades old and remained a sterling example of
the judiciary recognizing an acute injustice and crafting a remedy where
the political branches had failed. While a comparison to the revered
Brown decisions always risks stumbling into hyperbole, it is not
unreasonable to note their basic resemblance to the Mount Laurel cases.
In both Brown and Mount Laurel, the courts heard complaints by minority
groups alleging that government actors had violated their rights. The
courts broke ground by recognizing “fundamental rights” that had not
been previously observed. Yet both decisions were politically unpopular
in some sectors, and enforcement was neither easy nor immediate.
Finally, in both cases, the respective legislatures eventually lent their
support by passing statutes to promote compliance with the constitutional
mandate: Congress with its Civil Rights Act to, inter alia, promote
integration, and the New Jersey Legislature with its Fair Housing Act to
streamline and formalize the affordable housing mission.
At this point, the two stories diverge. Racial integration is today an
uncontroversial principle: a Gallup poll in 1994 found that eighty-seven
percent of Americans approved of Brown, a figure that consistently
increased in the decades following the case and is likely higher today. 150
But affordable housing, particularly as formulated in Mount Laurel,
remains fiercely contested. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie pushed
in 2010 to end the “COAH nightmare” and to “[place housing
development] back into the hands of local municipalities.”151 He took
for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement . . . .”).
149
See Robert C. Holmes, The Clash of Home Rule and Affordable Housing: The Mount
Laurel Story Continues, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 325, 347 n.161 (2013) (“A case likely in the
minds of the Mount Laurel court is Brown v. Bd. of Education. The court also likely
considered familiar adages associated with social change: that rules are not self-executing and
that a rule change is no good without a political base to support it.” (citations omitted)).
150
Joseph Carroll, Race and Education 50 Years After Brown v. Board of Education,
GALLUP NEWS SERV. (May 14, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/11686/race-educationyears-after-brown-board-education.aspx. Even though the American public overwhelmingly
endorses integration, it remains an incomplete mission and, in fact, may be regressing from
the victories achieved immediately post-Brown. This note poses the Brown comparison as an
example of aggressive judicial action to recognize and enforce a constitutional right; however,
it should not be read to imply that Brown has been an unmitigated success or that such judicial
action guarantees favorable outcomes in the long term. See generally Gary Orfield et al.,
Brown at 60: Great Progress, a Long Retreat and an Uncertain Future, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT
(May
2014),
https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-anuncertain-future/Brown-at-60-051814.pdf (examining the state of race- and wealth-based
segregation in schools six decades after Brown).
151
Lisa Fleisher, N.J. Gov. Chris Christie Creates Task Force to Review Affordable
Housing, NJ.COM (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/02/
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steps to dismantle the agency altogether.152 The legislature expressed its
own animus toward Mount Laurel when it passed a bill to abolish the
COAH and devolve affordable-housing authority back to local
governments.153
While the COAH survived the assault by the political branches, the
move against it was not the work of a renegade governor and
legislature.154 For decades, critics have condemned the Mount Laurel
doctrine, both on separation of powers grounds and for the perceived
damage it has done to New Jersey taxpayers. 155 In a 1985 New York
Times editorial, New Jersey Assemblyman William Flynn pointed out
that the judiciary “consists of no elected officials” and argued that “the
recent Mount Laurel housing decisions” had “usurp[ed] the law-making
power of the Legislature.”156 A 2012 article cast the SCNJ as “the most
activist state appellate court in America” and accused it of “hijacking
zoning powers from towns and cities.”157 The SCNJ’s “builder’s
remedy” mechanism was “a nightmarish burden on communities” and the
Mount Laurel doctrine overall had “transformed many towns” for the
worse.158 A 2014 editorial lamented the “sorry tradition” of Republican
governors “endors[ing] a liberal activist chief justice,” exemplified by
Chief Justice Richard Hughes, who headed the SCNJ when Mount Laurel
I “imposed Soviet-style housing plans on every municipality in the
state.”159 “By the time Hughes was done, the state was being run by its
nj_gov_chris_christie_creates_1.html.
152
STATE OF N.J. EXEC. DEP’T., Reorganization Plan No. 001-2011, A Plan for the
Abolition of the Council on Affordable Housing and Providing for the Transfer of the
Functions, Powers, and Duties of the Council on Affordable Housing to the Department of
Community Affairs (June 29, 2011), http://www.nj.gov/dca/services/lps/hss/transinfo/0012011.pdf.
153
S. 1, 214th Leg., 2010–11 Sess. (N.J. 2010) (conditionally vetoed Jan. 2011). See also
News Release, Giordano Halleran & Ciesla, New Jersey State Senate Passes Bill S-1,
GIORDANO HALLERAN & CIESLA ATTORNEYS AT LAW, http://www.ghclaw.com/65C0C8
/Articles/2010/GianettiNewsRelease2010.pdf (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016).
154
In re Plan for the Abolition of the Council on Affordable Hous., 70 A.3d 559 (N.J.
2013).
155
Taxation in New Jersey is a frequently contentious political issue, considering the
state’s already-high rates. See Jared Walczak, How High Are Property Taxes in Your State?,
TAX FOUND. BLOG (Aug. 13, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/how-high-are-propertytaxes-your-state.
156
William E. Flynn, New Jersey Opinion; On the Checks and Balances Within the State
Government, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/03/
opinion/new-jersey-opinion-on-the-checks-and-balances-within-the-state-government.html.
157
Steven Malanga, The Court That Broke Jersey, CITY J. (Winter 2012),
http://www.city-journal.org/2012/22_1_nj-supreme-court.html.
158
Id.
159
Paul Mulshine, Editorial, Chris Christie Dooms NJ to Judicial Activism and Himself
to Obscurity, NJ.COM (May 27, 2014), http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/
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Supreme Court rather than its legislature and governor.”160
New Jerseyans in general are more divided on the issue, but there is
hardly a zealous public movement to support the SCNJ’s action. In a
2009 poll, only just more than half of the respondents approved of the
basic Mount Laurel affordable-housing principle.161 Three quarters of
respondents knew little or nothing at all about the cases themselves or
about the COAH.162
To be fair, the Mount Laurel doctrine is not some divine instruction;
it, like all products of government, is necessarily imperfect, if only
because the interests of the myriad New Jersey municipalities are
complex and diverse. But the doctrine remains an interpretation of the
state constitution, and its requirements are not easily dismissed simply
because they prove difficult to implement, politically unpopular, or
burdensome on the tax base.163 While Mount Laurel bears certain
resemblances to Brown, the latter today represents an uncontroversial
public value—that racial integration is beneficial and desirable—while
the values underlying the former do not enjoy similar support. Faithfully
vindicating Mount Laurel will require the active leadership of a body that
can observe its constitutional duty without bending to political or popular
criticism.
C. SCNJ’s Stewardship of the Mount Laurel Mission
Many of the Mount Laurel criticisms are grounded in the notion that
both the original doctrine and its subsequent enforcement were mere bald
gambits by the SCNJ to seize political power. Mount Laurel was
lawmaking from the bench, a clear encroachment of the judiciary into a
space reserved for the legislature. However, the SCNJ’s words and
actions more fairly characterize the court as only a reluctant executor of
the doctrine.
i. Mount Laurel I
In the very first Mount Laurel trial court case, the Law Division
ordered the defendant towns to draft an affordable-housing plan, but it
intended to retain jurisdiction of the matter only “until a final order
2014/05/chris_christies_judicial_picks_put_activists_in_control_mulshine.html.
160
Id.
161
FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIV., Opinion Poll, Mt. Laurel, COAH, and the Race for
Governor (Feb. 25–Mar. 2, 2009), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/coah/.
162
Id.
163
Cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). While discussing affirmative action in
higher education, the Supreme Court stated, “The fact that the implementation of a program
[that satisfies constitutional requirements] might present administrative challenges does not
render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.” Id. at 275.
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issue[d] requiring implementation of the plan as agreed upon.”164 From
the very start, there was no design for the courts to become a permanent
enforcer; they would merely inspect a town’s proposal, approve its terms,
and then withdraw from the matter. The SCNJ, affirming the Law
Division by deciding Mount Laurel I, settled on much the same
conclusion, and it explicitly recognized that local governments were to
retain autonomy: “It is the local function and responsibility, in the first
instance at least, rather than the court’s, to decide on the details of the
same within the guidelines we have laid down.”165 “It is not appropriate
at this time . . . to deal with the matter of the further extent of judicial
power in the field or to exercise any such power.”166
ii. Mount Laurel II
In Mount Laurel II, the SCNJ again was alert to how critics might
perceive its action. Its strategy was to acknowledge the controversy:
[A] brief reminder of the judicial role in this sensitive area is
appropriate, since powerful reasons suggest, and we agree,
that the matter is better left to the Legislature. We act first
and foremost because the Constitution of our State requires
protection of the interests involved and because the
Legislature has not protected them. We recognize the social
and economic controversy (and its political consequences)
that has resulted in relatively little legislative action in this
field. We understand the enormous difficulty of achieving a
political consensus that might lead to significant legislation
enforcing the constitutional mandate better than we can,
legislation that might completely remove this Court from
those controversies. But enforcement of constitutional rights
cannot await a supporting political consensus. So while we
have always preferred legislative to judicial action in this
field, we shall continue—until the Legislature acts—to do
our best to uphold the constitutional obligation that underlies
the Mount Laurel doctrine. That is our duty. We
may not
build houses, but we do enforce the Constitution.167
The SCNJ viewed itself as the reluctant but duty-bound torchbearer
of the state constitution.
The provision of decent housing for the poor is not a function
of this Court. Our only role is to see to it that zoning does not
prevent it, but rather provides a realistic opportunity for its
construction as required by New Jersey’s Constitution. The
actual construction of that housing will continue to depend,
in a much larger degree, on the economy, on private
enterprise, and on the actions of the other branches of
government at the national, state and local level. We intend
164
165
166
167

S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 290 A.2d at 474.
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 734.
Id.
Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 417 (emphasis added).
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here only to make sure that if the poor remain locked into
urban slums,168
it will not be because we failed to enforce the
Constitution.
iii. Fair Housing Act, Council on Affordable Housing, and
Beyond
In Hills Development Company v. Bernards (“Mount Laurel III”),
the SCNJ heard and rejected a challenge to the FHA, effectively ratifying
the legislature’s response to Mount Laurel.169 The SCNJ did caution that
“[i]f . . . the [FHA], despite the intention behind it, achieves nothing but
delay, the judiciary will be forced to resume its appropriate role”;
however, presumably, Mount Laurel III should have signaled the end of
the SCNJ’s role in the affordable-housing controversy.170 The COAH, a
legislatively created executive agency, now had the reins. While “the
[COAH’s] decisions can still be challenged in court,” the courts “will [for
the most part] be out of the zoning business.”171 Chief Justice Robert
Wilentz wrote, “This kind of response, one that would permit us to
withdraw from this field, is what this court has always wanted and
sought. It is potentially far better for the state and its lower-income
citizens.”172
The birth of the COAH quieted the controversy momentarily, until
it was time for the agency to compose and adopt third-round rules.173
Considering the importance of the COAH’s work, the SCNJ arguably
could have been justified in taking a firmer hand at the first sign of delay.
Instead, it repeatedly granted extensions for the COAH to draft and redraft the rules.174 It took fifteen years for the SCNJ’s patience to
expire.175 Even then, as the SCNJ ordered a return to the judicial
remedies it had practiced before Mount Laurel II, it was circumspect: its
aim was not to usurp the COAH and modify its procedures to suit judicial
preference, but rather to act as a surrogate until the COAH had put its
own house into order, so to speak.
The process developed herein is one that seeks to track the
processes provided for in the FHA. Doing so will facilitate a
return to a system of coordinated administrative and court
actions in the event that COAH eventually promulgates
168

Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
Mount Laurel III, 510 A.2d 621.
170
Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
171
Op-Ed, Judicial Duty in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24,
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/24/opinion/judicial-duty-in-new-jersey.html.
172
Id. (emphasis added).
173
See supra Part II.B.3–4.
174
See supra Part II.B.4.
175
See Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d 31.
169

1986),
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constitutional Third Round Rules that will allow for the
reinstitution of agency proceedings. The judicial role here is
not to become a replacement agency for COAH. The agency
is sui generis—a legislatively created, unique device for
securing satisfaction of Mount Laurel obligations. In opening
the courts for hearing challenges to, or applications seeking
declarations of, municipal compliance with specific
obligations, it is not this Court’s province to create an
alternate form of statewide administrative decision maker for
unresolved
policy details of replacement Third Round
Rules.176
The SCNJ further emphasized that it would not resist if the COAH
or the legislature moved to overrule its decision.
[N]othing herein should be understood to prevent COAH
from fulfilling its statutory mission to adopt constitutional
rules to govern municipalities’ Third Round obligations in
compliance with the FHA. Nor should the action taken by
this Court, in the face of COAH’s failure to fulfill its statutory
mission, be regarded as impeding the Legislature from
considering
alternative statutory remedies to the present
FHA.177
Even the doctrine’s most cynical critic must concede that the SCNJ
has been eager to yield to its collateral branches. But the SCNJ has also
demonstrated that it will not compromise the principles expressed in
Mount Laurel.
D. Proposed Solution
The SCNJ’s reluctance to take control is precisely why it should be
trusted with control. The court is mindful of its role in the machinery of
government, and its words and actions over the last forty years indicate
that its motive in regard to Mount Laurel is merely to enforce the
Constitution.178 In contrast, the other branches’ motives are colored by
political and partisan factors. Each time the SCNJ has acted, it has been
only to mend an injury that the other branches caused, whether by total
neglect or by ineffective half-measures. The political branches have not
only shirked their constitutional duty but have actively thwarted it. As
long as Mount Laurel is enforced—or not—at the pleasure of the
legislature or an executive agency, the affordable-housing mission first
charged in Mount Laurel I will not be achieved.
176

Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
Id. at 34–35.
178
Even beyond the Mount Laurel context, consider the Court’s record of ruling against
its own self-interest when the Constitution demands it. “Judges, to the extent humanly
possible, interpret the Constitution fairly, fearlessly, and independently, even when the issue
touches on the judiciary’s institutional concerns.” In re P.L. 2001, Chapter 362, 895 A.2d
1128, 1143 (N.J. 2006) (citing cases where the Court’s decision had the effect of reducing
judicial power in a particular area).
177

JOSEPH MARSICO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

A FORTY-YEAR FAILURE

8/30/2017 12:17 PM

173

There must be a judicial solution. Before the legislature passed the
FHA, municipalities were subject to the procedures authorized in Mount
Laurel II—particularly, builder’s remedy courts and a special litigation
track dedicated to exclusionary housing claims. This note proposes a
permanent return to the Mount Laurel II scheme or one substantially
similar to it. The courts originally withdrew from the affordable-housing
issue when the legislature stepped in, believing judicial leadership was
no longer necessary, but the record is clear that a task as controversial as
affordable housing in New Jersey cannot be handled effectively by a body
subject to political pressures.
Because the Mount Laurel II scheme proved unpopular among
certain factions, the legislature might move to again craft a statutory
response as it did with the FHA in 1985. But the SCNJ must remain
skeptical and permit alternative remedies only when it can be confident
that such remedies would effectively fulfill the constitutional mandate.
The SCNJ might even permit a legislative option to coexist with its own
judicial enforcement scheme. However, at all times, the judicial scheme
should remain available to resolve an exclusionary zoning complaint in
the first instance. The SCNJ was fooled when it trusted the political
branches to faithfully assume the burden and it should not be fooled
again.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mount Laurel I made clear that the New Jersey Constitution requires
each municipality to bear a reasonable portion of the state’s collective
affordable housing burden. While the decision remains controversial
today, its constitutional authority remains, and there can be no question
that it continues to bind both the state government and each local
government exercising the police power. However, the legislative and
executive branches have proven repeatedly that they are obstacles to
properly realizing Mount Laurel. Where there are constitutional rights at
stake, it is both the SCNJ’s power and duty to supply relief. The SCNJ
should take charge of Mount Laurel enforcement to assure the state’s
citizens the housing rights guaranteed by their constitution.
In the interest of completeness, it should be acknowledged that this
note presumes that Mount Laurel is both constitutionally sound and,
ultimately, a good policy choice for New Jersey. Arguments that the
doctrine is unconstitutional (or, at least, is not constitutionally required)
or that it is bad public policy have been thoroughly addressed elsewhere
and are outside the scope of this note. Further, the entire issue of judicial
involvement in Mount Laurel would be obviated if the people of New
Jersey were to amend their constitution to foreclose the SCNJ from
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participating in the affordable-housing issue or to exclude any
interpretation that would grant a constitutional right to housing. Finally,
to what extent the earlier proposed solution is practicable is, again,
outside the scope of this note. To implement such an intricate solution to
such a complicated problem would require much more fact-finding and
analysis than this note is able to contain.

